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## 2AC Proliferation Bad Frontline 1/4

### Proliferation makes every conflict go nuclear – causes extinction

National Journal 9-14-2K2 (“Invading Iraq Wouldn't Necessarily Make Us Safer”)

That risk dwarfs anything that Saddam Hussein could do with chemical or biological weapons. And even if he drops dead tomorrow, it is quite probable that we will experience such a catastrophe within 20 years-if not 20 months-unless we do two things that are barely on the national radar screen and that go against the grain of Republican unilateralism. The first is to spend whatever it takes to secure the vast Russian nuclear stockpile and other nuclear installations around the world. They are far more dangerous than Saddam because there is no doubt that Al Qaeda (and perhaps other terrorists) will use any unsecured weapons or fissile (bomb-making) materials against us if they can get ahold of them. The second is to get much, much more serious about stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a huge threat to civilization itself. A push to end nuclear proliferation could work only if enforced by the threat or use of pre-emptive military action-not only in Iraq but also in Iran, North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others of the more than 60 nations capable of building nuclear weapons-either on our own or through an international coalition. Doing this on our own, as Bush administration hawks prefer, could mean launching bloody invasion after invasion, at enormous cost in lives, treasure, and international standing, if rogue states call our bluff. Rallying a potent and determined coalition seems possible only if we stop thumbing our nose at world opinion, offer to scrap the bulk of our own arsenal, and renounce first use of nuclear weapons in exchange for similar concessions by others. The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation, another five or 10 potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off anonymously on our soil by terrorists or a terrorist government. Even an airtight missile defense would be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat. As to Iraq, unless we can get U.N. Security Council support for whatever we decide to do (on which, more below), either a go-it-alone U.S.-British invasion or a Bush backdown from the beating of war drums would carry incalculable risks. An invasion would, of course, end Saddam's quest for nuclear weapons and probably Saddam himself. So far, so good. But some hawks greatly underestimate the costs and risks, claiming that an easy victory in Iraq will lead to a flowering of democracy that will inspire the rest of the Arab world to follow suit, destroy the appeal of militant Islam, pave the way for Israeli-Palestinian peace, and make us all safer. This is a fantasy. Unless Saddam is overthrown from within, we would have to take Baghdad in house-to-house fighting, with many thousands of casualties. The task of pacifying and democratizing a nation that has never known freedom and hates our ally Israel would be at least as difficult as bringing peace and democracy to Afghanistan. And the administration has not made a very credible beginning there. The effects of a unilateral invasion on our national security would extend far beyond Iraq. Viewed optimistically, it might also-if accompanied by a credible threat to launch a succession of pre-emptive wars-convince Iran, Libya, North Korea, and other potential threats that we would do the same to them if they persist in developing nuclear weapons. But then again, rogue nations might react by hiding, rather than ending, their bomb- building programs. And as the cost of a policy of pre-emptive wars without end becomes apparent, American voters might balk. A U.S.-British invasion would also divert resources from the war against Al Qaeda, especially in Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda is already regrouping. It would alienate Russia and others whose cooperation we need in the vital project of securing fissile materials. It would thereby increase the danger of a nuclear attack by Al Qaeda or others. By enraging hundreds of millions of Muslims worldwide, it would swell the ranks of terrorist groups-perhaps making it easier for them to recruit nuclear engineers as well as suicide bombers-and risk a militant Islamist takeover of nuclear-armed Pakistan. Years or even decades of sometimes-bloody occupation could keep the hate- America pot boiling. With Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south demanding independence, we would have to choose between crushing those movements and alienating Turkey, a vital ally with a region of restive Kurds bordering Iraq. Many in Europe and elsewhere would see the Bush administration as less interested in democratizing Iraq than in controlling the region's oil and in achieving world domination. All of this international ill will could doom any hope for support in fighting nuclear proliferation. Does all of this mean that a unilateral invasion should be ruled out as complete folly? Not necessarily. The dangers of backing down are also grave. It is foolish for doves to scoff at the risk that a nuclear-armed Saddam could or would launch what they say would be a "suicidal" attack on the United States. He seems entirely capable of smuggling a bomb into one of our cities, perhaps in league with Al Qaeda, and setting it off anonymously in the hope of escaping retaliation. If we stand aside while Saddam builds or buys nuclear weapons, and if at some point thereafter a bomb takes out Washington or New York, how could we be sure that Saddam was involved? The culprits might be terrorists connected, not to Iraq, but perhaps to Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, or Libya. Against whom would we retaliate? Doves also seem disingenuous in ruling out an invasion unless and until we can produce irrefutable evidence that Saddam presents an imminent nuclear threat. Most would be no less dovish after seeing such proof than they are now. After all, once Iraq has nuclear arms, an invasion would be far more perilous. So a decision not to invade now is a decision not to invade ever-not, at least, until Saddam has actually used nuclear or biological weapons or repeated his use of chemical weapons. And a Bush backdown now would surely embolden other rogue states to accelerate their nuclear programs. In short, the future will be extremely dangerous no matter what we do about Iraq. The best way out would be to use the threat of a unilateral invasion to push the U.N. Security Council to demand that Iraq submit to unconditional, unrestricted arms inspections, as proposed by President Chirac of France, followed by military action if Saddam balks or cheats or it becomes clear that inspections cannot be effective. France and Russia might go along, suggests a former Clinton administration official, if that were the only way to get a piece of the post- invasion protectorate over the world's second-largest oil supply. We should not become so fixated on Iraq that we ignore the greater dangers: Al Qaeda, loose nuclear materials in Russia and elsewhere, and nuclear proliferation. House Republicans have idiotically refused to provide adequate funding to secure nuclear stockpiles abroad. They and the Bush administration have greatly damaged the effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by spurning the closely related Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, without which more and more nations will be tempted to seek nuclear weapons. Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-weapons states, where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "the survival of civilization truly is in question from day to day," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal organizations." So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The only way to avoid such a grim future, he suggests in his memoir, Disarmament Sketches, is for the United States to lead an international coalition against proliferation by showing an unprecedented willingness to give up the vast majority of our own nuclear weapons, excepting only those necessary to deter nuclear attack by others.

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### Nuclear spread will cause global nuclear war – shorter flight times and lack of second strike capacity

Cimbala, PolSci Professor at UPenn, ‘8 (Stephen, March, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia” Comparative Strategy, Vol 27 No 2, p 113-132, InformaWorld)

The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.17 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states’ nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo–oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore, slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions. These arguments, for a less alarmist viewof nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the “first nuclear age,” roughly corresponding to the Cold War.18 Pessimists who predicted that some thirty or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the ColdWar was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence “rationality” according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war outside of Europe.19

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### Proliferation magnifies the risk of every impact – guarantees extinction

Krieger – President, NAPF –9/4 David, Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years, https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04\_krieger\_newsweek\_response.php?krieger

Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous….” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.’” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future. Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?

2AC Proliferation Bad Frontline 4/4

### Nuclear weapons decrease global security and international instability\*\*\*

Busch, Professor of Government at Christopher Newport University, ‘4 (Nathan, “No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation” p 281-314)

Summing Up: Will the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be Better or Worse? This study has revealed numerous reasons to be skeptical that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase international stability by helping prevent conventional and nuclear wars. Because there is reason to suspect that emerging NWSs will not handle their nuclear weapons and fissile materials any better than current NWSs have, we should conclude that the further spread of nuclear weapons will tend to undermine international stability in a number of ways. First, because emerging NWSs will probably rely on inadequate command-and-control systems, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use will tend to be fairly high. Second, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt systems that allow for rapid response, the risks of inadvertent war will also be high, especially during crisis situations. Third, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt MPC&A systems that are vulnerable to overt attacks and insider thefts, the further spread of nuclear weapons could lead to rapid, destabilizing proliferation and increased opportunities for nuclear terrorism. Finally, there is reason to question whether nuclear weapons will in fact increase stability. Although nuclear weapons can cause states to be cautious about undertaking actions that can be interpreted as aggressive and can prevent states from attacking one another, this may not always be the case. While the presence of nuclear weapons did appear to help constrain U.S. and Soviet actions during the Cold War, this has generally not held true in South Asia. Many analysts conclude that Pakistan invaded Indian-controlled Kargil in 1999, at least in part, because it was confident that its nuclear weapons would deter a large-scale Indian retaliation. The Kargil war was thus in part caused by the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Thus, the optimist argument that nuclear weapons will help prevent conventional war has not always held true. Moreover, this weakness in the optimist argument should also cause us to question the second part of their argument, that nuclear weapons help prevent nuclear war as well. Conventional wars between nuclear powers can run serious risks of escalating to nuclear war."5 Based on a careful examination of nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, as well as preliminary studies of the programs in Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, this book concludes that the optimists' arguments about the actions that emerging NWSs will probably take are overly optimistic. While it is impossible to prove that further nuclear proliferation will necessarily precipitate nuclear disasters, the potential consequences are too severe to advocate nuclear weapons proliferation in hopes that the stability predicted by the optimists will indeed occur.

### Proliferation makes accidental launch likely\*\*

Busch, Professor of Government at Christopher Newport University, ‘4 (Nathan, “No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation” p 281-314)

Will Emerging NWSs Be Likely to Avoid Inadvertent Use? This study has demonstrated that the further spread of nuclear weapons would probably increase the risks of inadvertent use. As we have seen, the risks of inadvertent use are relatively high among current NWSs, and there is little reason to think that emerging NWSs will avoid these risks. The pressures to build survivable forces caused both the United States and Russia to develop systems that allowed for launch-on-warning. In order to allow for LOW, they placed their nuclear weapons on permanent alert in the early 1960s, which would allow the weapons to be launched within fifteen minutes from a detected attack. They also developed sophisticated early-warning systems to detect incoming nuclear attacks. As pessimists have argued, the policies of LOW require rapid decision-making, which significantly increases the risks of panic-launches due to miscalculation or false warnings.

## No Rational Actors 1/2

### Even if states are rational militaries will hijack the agenda

Sagan, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 158)

Waltz's optimism is fueled by a strong belief that the constraints of the international system, and the potential costs of any nuclear war, will produce similar, and essentially rational, decisions in all states. As he puts it, "Whatever the identity of rulers, and whatever the characteristics of their states, the national behaviors they produce are strongly conditioned by the world outside" (Ch. 4, p. 132). This assumption, that states will recognize and act in their "objective" interests, as determined by external forces, undergirds his entire argument. In contrast, my pessimism is fueled by the belief that the military and other government organizations play a very important intervening role between the interests of statesmen and the behavior of states. The information these organizations pass on, the plans and routines they develop, and the biases they hold continually shape the actions of states in very important ways. Waltz stresses the unprecedented power of nuclear weapons and argues that "nobody but an idiot can fail to comprehend their destructive force[.] What more is there to learn?" (Ch. 4, p. 132). Unfortunately, there is a lot more to learn. States have to learn how to avoid accidents, how to prevent terrorists from stealing their weapons, how to build sur-vivable forces, how to control their militaries, and how to limit escalation. All political leaders may well desire such reasonable things. Yet, between the desire and the deed lies the shadow of organizations. The difficult tasks of proper organizational design and management are not automatically achieved simply because senior statesmen understand the effects of nuclear weapons. And they certainly are not guaranteed to exist in every state that develops these horribly destructive weapons. To prevent them from ever possessing such weapons. This antiterrorist imperative adds yet one more compelling reason why the spread of nuclear weapons to potential proliferant states is to be feared, not welcomed. The best way, by far, to prevent Islamic terrorists from possessing nuclear weapons is to prevent unstable states, especially unstable Islamic states, from possessing nuclear weapons. Pakistan is clearly the most serious concern in the short run. Pakistani weapons lack the advanced Permissive Actions Link (PALs) locks that make it difficult for a terrorist or other unauthorized individual to use a stolen nuclear weapon. In June 2001, Pakistani officials also acknowledged that there were no specialized Pakistani teams trained on how to seize or dismantle a nuclear weapon if one was stolen. No dedicated personnel reliability program (PRP) was in place to ensure the psychological stability and reliability of the officers and guards of Pakistan's nuclear forces. 12 Instead, Pakistani soldiers and scientists with nuclear responsibilities were reviewed and approved for duty if they were not suspected of being Indian agents by the Inter Services Intelligence (IS!) agency.

No Rational Actors 2/2

### Even assuming rational actors – accidents and conflicting decision-making makes instability inevitable

Sagan, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 74-75)

My own book, The Limits of Safety, adds an explicitly political dimension to "normal accidents theory," combining with Perrow's structural arguments to produce even greater pessimism about the likelihood of organizational accidents. Conflicting objectives inevitably exist inside any large organization that manages hazardous technology: some top-level authorities may place a high priority on safety, but others may place a higher value on more parochial objectives, such as increasing production levels, enhancing the size of their sub-unit, or promoting their individual careers, which can lead to risky behaviors. Such a focus on the political manner in which conflicting goals are chosen and pursued is necessary to explain both why systems with such dangerous structural characteristics are constructed and why organizational learning about safety problems is often severely limited.73

Normal accidents theory suggests that each of the three basic strategies used to improve organizational safety is highly problematic. In some conditions, adding redundant back-up systems can be very counterproductive: redundancy makes the system both more complex and more opaque and therefore can create hidden catastrophic common-mode errors. Large organizations nevertheless often continue to add layers of redundancy upon redundancy to complex systems.7\* Why? Organizations often add redundancy not only when it is needed to improve reliability but also because they must appear to be doing something to solve problems after accidents occur. Unproductive redundancy is also sometimes constructed because such redundant systems serve the narrow interests of organizational subunits, when it enhances their size, resources, and autonomy. The politics of blame inside organizations also reduces trial-and-error learning from accidents because organizational leaders have great incentives to find operators at lower levels at fault: this absolves higher leaders from responsibility, and, moreover, it is usually cheaper to fire the operator than to change accident-prone procedures or structures. Knowing this, however, field-level operators have strong incentives not to report safety incidents whenever possible. Finally, from a normal accidents perspective, strong culture and socialization can have negative effects on organizational reliability since they encourage excessive concern about the organization's reputation, disdain for outsiders' and internal dissenters' opinions, and even organizational cover-ups.

The U.S. Nuclear Safety Experience From the perspective of normal accidents theory, there are strong reasons to expect that the safety of modern nuclear arsenals is inherently limited: large-scale arsenals and command systems are highly complex, by necessity, and are tightly-coupled, by design, to ensure prompt retaliation under attack; the military organizations that manage them are inevitably politicized, with numerous conflicting interests existing between commands and the broader society and within the organizations themselves. How serious were the dangers of U.S. nuclear weapons accidents and even accidental war during the cold war? The available evidence now demonstrates that there were many more near-accidents than previously recognized. Moreover, the U.S. military's reaction to these safety problems shows how only limited degrees of organizational learning took place.

## Proliferation Bad – Instability 1/2

### Empirical support that proliferation increases instability

Asal, Professor of Political Science at State U of New York, and Beardsley, Professor of Political Science at Emory University, ‘7 (Victor and Kyle, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior” Journal of Peace Research, Vol 44 No 2, p 139-155, SagePub)

Nuclear Weapons and Instability The anti-proliferation argument about the possible contribution of nuclear weapons to the outbreak of war rests on the fear that these weapons, given their destructive capabilities, are inherently dangerous and their spread to a variety of places is counterproductive. What dangers does proliferation pose? In the short term, the great dangers are a regional nuclear war, which could obliterate cities, kill millions and devastate downwind areas; and nuclear terrorism. . . . Over the longer term, there will be new nuclear threats as more and more nations acquire more sophisticated delivery systems. (Forsberg et al., 1995: 2) Given the magnitude of the risk that nuclear weapons pose, those who argue against proliferation do not see a payoff that matches the risks. Nuclear weapons are ‘obstacles to, rather than facilitators of, international security’ (Hanson, 2002: 361). Anti-proliferators (1) question whether nuclear weapons prevent war (a question of the very utility of deterrence); (2) wonder about its applicability to new proliferators and their rationality, even though it may have worked between the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War; (3) fear a war during a transition period to nuclear status of a member of an existing rivalry; and (4) fear the dangers of nuclear weapons being controlled by countries where the military is the deciding voice. In this article, we focus on the first of these questions and test if participation of one or more nuclear states in a crisis increases or decreases the likelihood that the crisis will devolve into war.3 McGwire (1994: 215) rejects the claim that nuclear weapons prevent major wars, except within a very narrow context. He gives examples of Vietnam, the Iran–Iraq War, and the Korean War. Based on his analysis of international crises, Geller supports this conclusion, stating that ‘nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to impede escalatory behavior by either nuclear or non-nuclear antagonists. . . . Nuclear disputes, however, show a pronounced tendency to escalate (short of war) and to engage coercive tactics that include the limited use of force’ (Geller, 1990: 307). Payne (1997) and Hanson (2002) go even further by raising the possibility that nuclear weapons were not even important to keeping peace between the superpowers.

### Your statistical authors concede the consequence of failed proliferation is high enough to outweigh potential pacifying effects

Asal, Professor of Political Science at State U of New York, and Beardsley, Professor of Political Science at Emory University, ‘7 (Victor and Kyle, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior” Journal of Peace Research, Vol 44 No 2, p 139-155, SagePub)

Our findings shed light only on the general impact that increasing the number of nuclear participants in a crisis has on the outcome of that crisis. We do not address other potential perils that proliferation might bring, such as greater risks of accident or the higher risks of use by terrorist networks. The pacification effect of nuclear states in crises is only one of many important factors to consider when states adopt their proliferation stances. And it should not be lost that the pacification effect is only so strong, as some serious violent conflicts have occurred between nuclear-weapon states. Zagare & Kilgour (2000) demonstrate that deterrence can fail in any number of situations. The costs of failed deterrence are so great when there are nuclear weapons involved that policymakers must seriously weigh the benefits of decreasing the likelihood of deterrence failure with increasing the costs of each failure instance.

Proliferation Bad – Instability 2/2

### Even if current nuclear weapons states are stable new nations won’t be

Horowitz, Professor of Political Science at UPenn, ‘9 (Michael, April 1, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 53 No 2, p 234-257)

These results are consistent with variants of the nuclear experience hypotheses presented above. The nuclear experience is not immutable – there are changes over time in the behavior of nuclear states. It is hard to untangle the different causal mechanisms or logics that govern the learning process, but some initial findings stand out. First, nuclear learning seems to occur especially for challengers, as more experienced nuclear states more efficiently challenge and succeed in militarized disputes. Second, new nuclear states appear the most “risky” from the perspective of low-level militarized disputes, with a higher probability of reciprocation than either experienced nuclear states or even nonnuclear states. One possible explanation is that nuclear defenders learn over time to differentiate those challenges worth pursing and those not worth the effort. The nuclear card cannot be played every time – otherwise the defender is exposed as a likely bluffer, making brinkmanship by initiators increasingly likely in repeated games. Third, if nothing else, the results suggest nuclear weapons increase the influence of proliferators. Acquiring nuclear weapons make a state harder to leverage, at least initially. This is consistent with the findings elsewhere in this issue, especially by Beardsley and Asal (this issue)

## Proliferation Bad – Accidents 1/2

### Weapons are not safe – social and political unrest causes accidents and accidental launch\*\*

Sagan, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 78-82)

The fifth reason to anticipate a significant increase in the risks of accidental and unauthorized weapons detonations is that serious political and social unrest is likely in the future in a number of these nuclear states. Waltz, in contrast, insists that domestic instability in new nuclear powers will not cause serious problems:

A nuclear state may be unstable or may become so. But what is hard to comprehend is why, in an internal struggle for power, the contenders would start using nuclear weapons. Who would they aim at? . . . One or another nuclear state will experience uncertainty of succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability of a regime. Those who fear the worst have not shown how those events might lead to the use of nuclear weapons. (Ch. I, p. 11) This exclusive focus on deliberate uses of nuclear weapons is misleading, however, since severe domestic instability can produce accidental detonations under many plausible scenarios. If a civil war in a new nuclear state leads to a fire fight between rival military factions at a nuclear weapons base, the danger of an accidental detonation or spreading of plutonium increases. If domestic unrest leads to severe economic hardships at military bases, disgruntled operators are more likely to engage in acts of sabotage that could inadvertently or deliberately produce accidents. An example of the type of dangerous incident one should anticipate in future nuclear states occurred in early 1992 at the lgnalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania, where a programmer reported that he had found a virus in the computer that ran the safety systems for the plant. Investigators later concluded, however, that he had placed the virus there himself in order to receive a pay bonus for improving safety.81 Finally, domestic political unrest can increase the risk of nuclear weapons accidents by encouraging unsafe transportation, exercise, or testing operations. If warheads are moved out of unstable regions in haste (as occurred in the USSR in 1991) or if weapons tests are rushed to prevent rebellious military units from gaining access to the weapons (as occurred in Algeria in 196182), safety is likely to be compromised. The most dramatic example of risky actions induced by domestic crises is Marshal Nie Rongzhen's October 1966 decision to launch a test missile eight hundred kilometers across China, with a live nuclear warhead onboard, in the middle of the Cultural Revolution. Nie was apparently fully aware of the risks involved in such an unprecedented test, but believed that the nuclear weapons program needed a dramatic and public sign of success as part of his "strategy of siding with the radicals to fend off radical penetration of the program."\*\*3In short, while there have been no catastrophic nuclear weapons accidents in the new nuclear states yet, there are good reasons to anticipate that the probabilities will be high over time. Any serious nuclear weapons accident will have tragic consequences for the local community; and if an accidental detonation, false warning, or unauthorized use of a weapon leads to "mistaken retaliation" and accidental war, the consequences would be even more catastrophic. As long as would-be nuclear states choose not to cross the final threshold of "weaponization" by actually deploying fully assembled nuclear weapons and launchers, these safety problems will largely remain dormant. Once these states begin to deploy-arsenals, however, such organizational safety problems are likely to emerge rapidly. The current positive safety record is therefore likely to be only the lull before the storm.

Proliferation Bad – Accidents 2/2

### Accidental nuclear use escalates – breaks the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons and causes extinction

Morgan, Professor of Foreign Studies at Hankuk University, ‘9 (Dennis Ray, December, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race” Futures, Vol 41 Issue 10, p 683-693, ScienceDirect)

And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or "lone wolf' act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the "use them or lose them" strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to "win" the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, "everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites' needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors" [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter. In "Scenarios," Moore summarizes the various ways a nuclear war could begin: Such a war could start through a reaction to terrorist attacks, or through the need to protect against overwhelming military opposition, or through the use of small battle field tactical nuclear weapons meant to destroy hardened targets. It might quickly move on to the use of strategic nuclear weapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missiles or long-range bombers. These could deliver high altitude bursts whose electromagnetic pulse knocks out electrical circuits for hundreds of square miles. Or they could deliver nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or non-nuclear military facilities, nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip all those steps and start through the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons. [10] She then goes on to describe six scenarios for catastrophic nuclear exchanges between various nations. Each scenario incorporates color-coded sections that illustrate four interrelated factors that will determine how a nuclear war will begin, proceed and escalate. These factors are labeled as accidental, aggressive, pre-emptive, and retaliatory. As for the accidental factor of nuclear war, both the U.S. and Russia have "launch on warning" systems that send off rockets before confirmation that a nuclear attack is underway; thus, especially during a time of tensions, a massive nuclear war could take place within only 30min after a warning-even if the warning is false. This scenario has almost happened on several occasions in the past. It was only because of individual human judgments, which disbelieved the false warnings, that nuclear war did not happen, but if the human judgment had indeed interpreted the warnings according to protocol, an all-out nuclear war would surely have taken place.

## Proliferation Bad – Hegemony

### Proliferation moots US conventional superiority – guarantees escalating conflict and nuclear war

Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and Member of the US Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, ‘9 (Henry, June/July, “Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd: How to Resist the Weapon’s Spread” Policy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)

There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want. None of this, however, is inevitable.

## Proliferation Unstable 1/2

### Rapid proliferation likely in new nuclear states\*\*

Busch, Professor of Government at Christopher Newport University, ‘4 (Nathan, “No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation” p 281-314)

As these accounts suggest, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use could be very high in emerging NWSs, particularly during nuclear crises or periods of domestic instability. The prospects for proliferation are therefore especially disturbing because emerging NWSs will tend to be more unstable than the established NWSs have been.5" For example, all three of the emerg-ing nuclear powers examined in this study—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea— have had significant risks of domestic instability. Although Saddam Hussein proved able to crush any opposition, he did experience a number of coup attempts (the most serious in 1992), as well as repeated riots and uprisings (in 1991, 1995, 1996, and 2000) during his time in power." And once an external invasion took place, all central authority evaporated quite rapidly.'2 The risks of regime-threatening upheavals are much greater, however, in North Korea and Iran than in Ba'athist Iraq. As we have seen, neither of these countries has great prospects for political stability in the near- to mid-term." In the event of severe upheavals or regime collapse, they could experience a rapid deterioration of their central controls over their nuclear weapons and related materials.

### Military bias causes deterrence failure and accidental launch\*\*

Sagan, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 83)

The nuclear optimists' view that the spread of nuclear weapons will produce stable deterrence is based on a rationalist assumption that the behavior of new nuclear states will reflect their interest in avoiding nuclear war. New nuclear powers will avoid preventive nuclear wars, develop survivable nuclear arsenals, and prevent nuclear weapons accidents because it is in their obvious national interests to do so. I have argued, in contrast, that the actual behavior of new proliferators will be strongly influenced by military organizations within those states and that the common biases, rigid routines, and parochial interests of these military organizations will lead to deterrence failures and accidental uses of nuclear weapons despite national interests to the contrary. The concepts behind this more pessimistic vision of proliferation are well-grounded in the rich theoretical and empirical literature on complex organizations. My theory makes less heroic assumptions about the rationality of states. It provides useful insights into U.S. nuclear history during the cold war, and it points to the checks-and-balances system of civilian control as a critical factor in creating the requirements of nuclear deterrence during the long peace. Although the jury of history is still out on the consequences of further nuclear proliferation, and will be for some time, the emerging evidence from the nuclear-proliferating world unfortunately supports this more pessimistic view.

Proliferation Unstable 2/2

### Wars stemming from proliferation would spread like wildfire we should evaluate them first

Carpenter in 2004 (Ted Galen Carpenter, the Cato Institute's vice president for defense and foreign policy studies, is the author of six books and the editor of 10 books on international affairs, “Not All Forms of Nuclear Proliferation Are Equally Bad,” This article appeared on cato.org on November 21, 2004, JR2)

The conventional wisdom is that all instances of nuclear weapons proliferation threaten the stability of the international system and the security interests of the United States. Indeed, that is the underlying logic of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, adopted by the bulk of the international community in the late 1960s, which is the centerpiece of the existing nonproliferation system. Members of the arms control community have over the decades spent an enormous amount of time and energy agonizing over the possibility that stable, democratic status quo powers such as Germany, Japan, Sweden and South Korea might decide to abandon the treaty and develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, they have devoted at least as much attention to that problem as they have to the prospect that unstable or aggressive states might build nuclear arsenals. The recent flap over the small scale (and probably unauthorized) nuclear experiments in South Korea is merely the latest example of such misplaced priorities.The hostility toward all forms of proliferation is not confined to dovish arms control types but extends across the political spectrum. As the North Korean nuclear crisis evolved in 2002 and 2003, some of the most hawkish members of the U.S. foreign policy community became terrified at the prospect that America's democratic allies in East Asia might build their own nuclear deterrents to offset Pyongyang's moves. Neoconservative luminaries Robert Kagan and William Kristol regarded such proliferation with horror: "The possibility that Japan, and perhaps even Taiwan, might respond to North Korea's actions by producing their own nuclear weapons, thus spurring an East Asian nuclear arms race . . . is something that should send chills up the spine of any sensible American strategist." That attitude misconstrues the problem. A threat to the peace may exist if an aggressive and erratic regime gets nukes and then is able to intimidate or blackmail its non-nuclear neighbors. Nuclear arsenals in the hands of stable, democratic, status quo powers do not threaten the peace of the region. Kagan and Kristol -- and other Americans who share their hostility toward such countries having nuclear weapons -- implicitly accept a moral equivalence between a potential aggressor and its potential victims.

## Proliferation Fast

### Rapid proliferation likely in new nuclear states\*\*

Busch, Professor of Government at Christopher Newport University, ‘4 (Nathan, “No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation” p 281-314)

As these accounts suggest, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use could be very high in emerging NWSs, particularly during nuclear crises or periods of domestic instability. The prospects for proliferation are therefore especially disturbing because emerging NWSs will tend to be more unstable than the established NWSs have been.5" For example, all three of the emerg-ing nuclear powers examined in this study—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea— have had significant risks of domestic instability. Although Saddam Hussein proved able to crush any opposition, he did experience a number of coup attempts (the most serious in 1992), as well as repeated riots and uprisings (in 1991, 1995, 1996, and 2000) during his time in power." And once an external invasion took place, all central authority evaporated quite rapidly.'2 The risks of regime-threatening upheavals are much greater, however, in North Korea and Iran than in Ba'athist Iraq. As we have seen, neither of these countries has great prospects for political stability in the near- to mid-term." In the event of severe upheavals or regime collapse, they could experience a rapid deterioration of their central controls over their nuclear weapons and related materials.

### Lack of experience makes proliferation rapid and poorly planned\*\*

Horowitz, Professor of Political Science at UPenn, ‘9 (Michael, April 1, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 53 No 2, p 234-257)

Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators, and the bureaucratic desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation, the “use it or lose it” mindset, may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, like launch on warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995).4 Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make them more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.5 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges.

## A2: Deterrence Solves

### Leaders won’t be deterred by rudimentary arsenals

Sagan, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 59-60)

Preventive War and New Nuclear States This evidence presented here does not demonstrate that the United States almost launched a preventive war on the USSR in the early cold war period- Nor do I mean to suggest that civilian leaders could never rationally choose to launch a preventive attack. This evidence does strongly suggest, however, that military officers have strong proclivities in favor of preventive war and that proliferation optimists are therefore wrong to assume that any leader of a state will automatically be deterred by an adversary's "rudimentary" arsenal, or even by a significantly larger one. Preventive nuclear attacks were clearly imagined, actively planned, and vigorously advocated by senior U.S. military leaders well beyond the initial development and deployment of nuclear weapons by the USSR. Without Truman's and Eisenhower's broader mix of moral and political objections to preventive war, the narrow military logic in favor of such an option might have prevailed.35 This basic pattern—senior military officers favoring preventive war against new proliferators with civilian leaders being more skeptical—was repeated in a number of other cases as well. In the early 1960s, the U. S. government contemplated taking preventive action to destroy the nuclear program of the People's Republic of China. Senior State Department officials held the position that Beijing would remain a weak and cautious power, even after it developed its first nuclear weapons, and that any U.S. unprovoked military action against China would damage America's reputation abroad. In contrast, the joint Chiefs of Staff argued that "the attainment of a nuclear capability by Communist China will have a marked impact on the security posture of the United States and the Free World." 17 The JCS maintained that a conventional weapons strike on Chinese nuclear sites would be feasible but nevertheless also recommended that nuclear weapons be considered for such an attack. The military position was eventually rejected. U.S. civilian authorities were not morally opposed to an unprovoked, preventive attack on the Chinese nuclear facilities. Indeed, officials in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations approached the Russians, in the hopes that Moscow would participate in or at a minimum acquiesce to an American strike against the Chinese. But when Moscow refused to cooperate, the U.S. government officials feared that the Soviets might retaliate in response to any attack on China, a key consideration in their decision not to use force to stop China from developing nuclear weapons.

### Deterrence doesn’t work in any society

Scott Sagan ‘94 (Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2539178.pdf>, Vol 18, No. 4, Spring)

Second, complex organizations commonly have multiple conflicting goals and the process by which objectives are chosen and pursued is intensely political.18 Such a political perspective envisions apparently irrational behav- iors as serving the narrow interests of some units within the organization, even if the actions appear "systematically stupid" from the leadership's over- all perspective.19 Organizations are not simply tools in the hands of higher- level authorities, but are groups of self-interested and competitive sub-units and actors. "Theory should see conflict as an inevitable part of organizational life stemming from organizational characteristics rather than from the char- acteristics of individuals," Charles Perrow has argued. Organizational divi- sions and responsibilities help explain why "sales and production [are] in conflict in all firms . . . or faculty and administration in colleges, doctors and nurses and administrators in hospitals, the treatment and custodial staffs in prisons."20 In military organizations, weapon system operators often have different interests than their commanders, units in the field have different interests than the command headquarters, and a particular service has dif- ferent interests than the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even when a professional military service or command acts in relatively rational ways to maximize its interests-protecting its power, size, autonomy or organizational essence- such actions do not necessarily reflect the organizational interests of the military as a whole, much less the national interests of the state. To the degree that narrow organizational interests determine state behavior, the expected-utility theory of a rational unitary actor is seriously undermined.

## A2: Rationality Solves

### Risky men don’t gamble the price of proliferation is too high it makes preventive strikes inevitable and unjustifiable

Debs AND Monteiro IN 2010 (Alexandre, Dept. of Political Science, Yale University, Nuno, Dept. of Political Science, Yale University “Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War,” SCHOLAR, JR2)

The second reason usually invoked to explain the absence of a U.S. preventive strike is morality. In a 1948 meeting with members of the AEC, Truman opposed the military’s request for control of the nuclear arsenal, arguing that nuclear weapons’ destructive power places them in a category of their own and adding “It is a terrible thing to order the use of something like that ... that is so terribly destructive, destructive beyond anything we have ever had” (quoted in Rhodes (1995, 327)). After the Soviet test, Truman justified the absence of a preventive strike by saying: “Such a war is the weapon of dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United States” (quoted in Sagan (1994, 78)). In short, moral reasons seem to have precluded a preventive attack. Yet many in American society – including political elites – had no moral qualms about endorsing a preventive strike. Indeed, Trachtenberg (2007, 4-5) writes that “when you look at the evidence from this period, you find preventive war arguments all over the place. ... [P]reventive war thinking was surprisingly widespread in the early nuclear age.”16 Moral arguments, therefore, cut both ways, and many invoked the morality of preventing the Soviets from acquiring the means to incinerate the West. In our view, the morality of a preventive war against the Soviets appeared questionable because of the magnitude it entailed. Put succinctly, initial U.S. war plans admitted that a war with the Soviet Union would be long and costly, first forcing the U.S. out of Europe. Later war plans were more optimistic about the prospects of victory, but only because the weakness of American conventional forces was to be compensated by a massive air-atomic campaign. In either set of circumstances, the costs of war exacerbated moral concern about prevention. While each of these two arguments – time window and morality – may have mattered, we argue that neither, in and of themselves, offers a convincing explanation of the U.S. decision not to strike the Soviet Union preventively. Our own explanation is that Truman understood – as did Stalin – that, although Soviet nuclear acquisition would have a significant adverse impact on U.S. power vis-`a-vis the Soviet Union, the costs of war (even accounting for the U.S. nuclear monopoly) were too high to allow for a preventive U.S. strike against the Soviet program.

## A2: Retaliation Solves

### Retaliation doesn’t eliminate the risk of accidents

Sagan, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 168-169)

Second, Waltz argues that new nuclear states will greatly fear retaliation, and will therefore make sure that their weapons are not used by accident or in an unauthorized manner. This is likely to be a leader's desire, but will it be the state's behavior? It is difficult to know, because strong contradictory pressures would exist in most new nuclear powers. On the one hand, strong incentives would certainly exist to keep such forces under very tight, centralized control. On the other hand, strong incentives would also exist to loosen such control in order to increase the likelihood that forces could retaliate after a first strike.21

Small arsenal size can have the opposite effect than what Waltz predicts. Fearing that an attack might destroy its forces, a small nuclear power will likely feel greater incentives to use increased missile alerts or unsafe aircraft operations (such as airborne alert), which inherently raise risks of accidents. Moreover, fearing a "decapitation" attack on its central leadership bunkers (as the United States tried to do to Iraq with conventional weapons in the Gulf War), the leader of a small nuclear power will feel incentives to delegate authority to alternative commanders in crises. Either policy increases the risks of accidents and unauthorized uses of nuclear weapons.

What is the evidence from new nuclear states? Good and bad news coexist here. On the positive side, some new nuclear nations—such as India and Pakistan—have thus far refrained from deploying alert weapons in peacetime, preferring to maintain "a bomb in the basement." This policy significantly reduces the risks of accidents and should be strongly encouraged, as I noted in Chapter 2. On the negative side, however, there are signs that new nuclear states are alerting their weapons in crises, using nuclear forces as signalling devices or preparing them for possible deliberate use in ways that also invariably raise the risks of accidental or unauthorized use. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, for example, U.S. intelligence agencies picked up signals that Israel had started to placed its nuclear weapons on fighter-bomber aircraft, which were readied for immediate launch. 22 Similar though unconfirmed reports exist that Israel also placed nuclear-tipped Jericho missiles on a high state of alert readiness during the Persian Gulf War in January 1991. 23 Finally, the evidence that Pakistan initiated some form of nuclear-altering activity during the 1999 Kargil conflict and 2001 terrorism crisis suggests that South Asian nuclear powers respond to similar pressures to take dangerous operational steps with their nuclear arsenals in crises.

## A2: Small Arsenal Solves

### Small arsenals doesn’t eliminate the risk of accidents

Sagan, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 167-168)

First, it may be true that the smaller the number of weapons, the less likely an accident, other things being equal. Unfortunately, in real life, other things are rarely equal. What produces the likelihood of accidents is not just the size of an arsenal, but rather the technical characteristics of the weapons themselves and the organizational characteristics of the arsenal. On the technical side, the evidence presented in Chapter 2 provides strong reasons to worry about whether new nuclear states' weapons will be designed in a safe manner. The Pakistani and Indian experience shows that similar technical design problems can emerge and produce serious accidents with nuclear delivery systems and false warnings of attack from command-and-control and warning systems in new nuclear states. On the organizational side, the key issue concerns not the size, but the structure of any new state's arsenal. Is it complex and tightly-coupled? Here one needs to assess the command and control systems, the warning systems, and the launch doctrines of new nuclear states. States that develop complex arsenals and command systems, and operate their weapons on high-alert levels in order to permit rapid launches, will be more accident-prone than states that do not adopt such force structures.

## A2: No Extinction Risk

### Precautionary Reasoning tells us to be skeptical of authors predicting the end of the world but that’s not a reason that they aren’t true – war still exists

Friedman IN 2007 (Benjamin H. Friedman is a doctoral candidate in political science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His article "The Terrible 'Ifs'" will appear in the winter issue of the Cato Institute's Regulation Magazine, “The Politics of Chicken Little(ism),” CATO, JR2)

Specific policies share this fault. Only precautionary reasoning justifies spending heavily to protect every U.S. town from terrorism. Terrorists could strike New Hampshire. But the possibility is so remote and the utility of the spending is so unclear that the Granite State's counter-terrorism funds would be better spent elsewhere. Another example is national policy on prospective employees for U.S. intelligence agencies. Security agents go to extremes to make sure a job applicant does not serve a foreign power — slowing clearances to a crawl. As a result, intelligence agencies cannot hire the people they most need — people who often hail from, or have relatives living in, foreign hot spots. In these areas, hawks claim that doves are reckless. Cutting homeland security funding to New Hampshire leaves Hanover less prepared. A CIA applicant might be spy. But hawks accept more risk from the dangers their policies create. The difference between hawks and doves turns on how they rate competing risks, not a penchant for risk or safety. Why do we conjure up so many possible monsters to destroy, and then overspend to confront them? One answer is that our defense policies are made by politicians and organizations that benefit from precautionary policies. In American politics today, there are no powerful doves. In elections, Democrats usually track right on security issues to shift the political battleground to domestic issues. Both parties see rewards in preaching danger. But if politicians do not check these policies, who will? Homeland security and military organizations exist to protect against particular threats. They do not weigh the total risk associated with their activities. Alaska's Office of Homeland Security will not argue that safety would be better served by reallocating their budget to the purchase of snowplows. The Air Force will not tell you that no rival justifies the F-22. Experts in think tanks and academia hoping for political appointments and grants often follow politicians and defense organizations' lead. The media, dependant on the government for stories and driven by the bottom line to alarmism, conveys worst-case fears. On the other side, as Congressman Les Aspin once wrote, there is no other side. No one alarms us about alarmism. Everyone likes lower taxes, but not enough to organize against defense spending. Only a scattering of libertarians and anti-war liberals confront a bipartisan precautionary principle juggernaut. Enlightenment won't solve the problem; powerful interests that are hurt by precautionary defense policies will. In most cases, interests have to be dragged into competition. That requires institutional mechanisms — like the Office of Management and Budget — that pit risk reducers' budgets against each others, that consider the safety value, for instance, of a dollar spent on health care against a dollar spent on defending Taiwan. No formula tells us how to maximize safety. But skepticism — toward both what we are told to fear and the defenses we are sold to confront it — is a good start.

## A2: This is Racist

### Others will make the same mistakes as the US – don’t believe their accusations of Eurocentrism

Sagan, Political Science at Stanford University, ‘3 (Scott– Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed” p 156-157)

The second basic error, however, is the opposite: to assume that others are better than we are. This is, I believe, the central problem with Kenneth Waltz's arguments about the consequences of proliferation. He appears to now accept many of the arguments made by scholars who have studied the operational accidents and near-accidents, conflicts in civil-military relations, and other organizational problems experienced by the United States during the cold war. Yet he maintains that other states will do better, will be smarter, will learn more quickly, will, in short, avoid the kinds of errors that we have suffered in the past. I believe, in contrast, that there are both strong theoretical reasons and empirical evidence to expect that new nuclear states will not avoid such problems. New nuclear powers may not make exactly the same mistakes as their predecessors; but they are likely to make their own serious errors, and some will be deadly.